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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the United States Supreme Court has had sev-
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
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eral occasions to speak to the so-called automobile exception to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution.' The Court has attempted in these cases to
clarify the scope of the exception, particularly as it relates to
searches of containers found within automobiles. 2 Unfortunately,
such efforts have failed to clearly define the scope of the authority
to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles. 3 Moreover, the Court
has seemed uncertain about the rationale supporting the automo-
bile exception, vascillating between theories which focused on the
impracticality of obtaining search warrants given the mobility of
vehicles, 4 and those which excused warrantless vehicular searches
because such intrusions supposedly offend only minimal privacy
expectations.5 So substantial was the doctrinal disarray, that a
leading commentator noted:
[T]he boundaries of [the automobile exception] remain uncertain. The
several decisions of the Court on this subject cannot be satisfactorily rec-
onciled, and in recent years the Court has often been unable to muster a
majority position on the issue. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that
these decisions constitute a "labyrinth of judicial uncertainty."
6
Neither did the muddle go unnoticed by members of the Court, as
attested by Justice Powell's recent lament: "The law of search and
seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing. The
Court apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously,
let alone on how ... [instant] cases should be decided."7
All of this was, however, prior to United States v. Ross,8 the
Court's eagerly awaited 1982 decision which was heralded as "the
opportunity for thorough consideration of ... basic principles" 9 in
hopes of "creat[ing] order out of the chaos . . . surrounding the
1. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam) (warrantless
at-the-scene searches of automobiles constitutionally permissible where po-
lice have probable cause which arises just prior to the search).
2. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981), which is discussed in de-
tail in the text accompanying notes 108-23 infra; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753 (1979), which is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 92-107
infra.
3. See 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT 508-09 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE].
4. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 459-62 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (warrantless automobile searches justified where exigent circum-
stances make obtaining a warrant impractical). Coolidge is discussed in de-
tail in the text accompanying notes 53-67 infra.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (warrantless
seaches of automobiles permitted because of "the diminished expectation of
privacy which surrounds the automobile") (dicta). Chadwick is discussed in
detail in the text accompanying notes 74-91 infra.
6. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 509.
7. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
8. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
9. Id. at 2168. See also text accompanying notes 152-240 infra.
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fourth amendment's application to searches of automobiles and
their contents."'10 Ross is now with us. The case commits a major-
ity of the Court to the proposition that law enforcement officers
may conduct warrantless searches of automobiles and containers
carried therein if the search is supported by a probable cause be-
lief that contraband is concealed somewhere within the vehicle."
The Ross holding, which precipitated dissents from three Jus-
tices,12 is a sweeping innovation to the law of search and seizure
which calls into question several recent Supreme Court opinions.13
The major significance of Ross may rest, however, not so much in
the fact that it breaks new ground in the controversial area of auto-
mobile searches-at the expense of prior case law no less-as in its
implications bearing on the future vitality of the warrant process
in fourth amendment jurisprudence generally.
This Article assesses the extent to which Ross indeed orders
chaos and charts an unequivocable and desirable course for the
law of vehicular searches under the fourth amendment. After fo-
cusing on Ross and its predecessor cases in the context of the auto-
mobile exception, the Article will assess the broader import of
Ross as a possible harbinger of a retreat from the general require-
ment for warrants to search personal effects, whether or not asso-
ciated with automobiles, and recommend ways to avoid such a
retreat.
II. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION: PRE-ROSS CASES
The fourth amendment, made applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 14 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
1 5
The United States Supreme Court has stated on numerous oc-
casions that governmental searches and seizures conducted with-
out prior judicial warrant are presumptively unreasonable and
10. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant
Clause, 19 Am. C~iM. L. REV. 557, 597 (1982).
11. 102 S. Ct. at 2159. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Blackmun, O'Connor, Powell, and Rhenquist, delivered the opinion for
the Ross Court.
12. Justices Marshall and Brennan joined in a dissenting opinion, 102 S. Ct. at
2173, and Justice White filed a separate dissent. Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 241-251.
14. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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therefore violative of the constitution.16 Under this interpretation
of the fourth amendment, the warrant clause requires warrants as
a precondition to valid searches and seizures. 17 The warrant re-
quirement is based on several considerations. Since the decision
whether or not a search or seizure is justified is made by a neutral
judge or magistrate, it is theoretically more impartial than if made
by law enforcement officers. 18 Thus, in situations where police
mistakenly believe probable cause exists for a search or seizure,
the warrant requirement may prevent unjustified invasions of pri-
vacy-which otherwise would occur in the absence of the warrant
rule-from occurring because the magistrate will not authorize in-
trusions in the absence of probable cause. Similarly, since war-
rants issue prior to the search or seizure, there is some assurance
that the information justifying the search did not initially come to
light after, or as a consequence of, the search.19 Finally, because
the fourth amendment requires particularity in the description of
the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,
the scope of the intrusion is limited by the warrant.
20
Warrants are not, however, constitutionally necessary in every
search and seizure case. The Court has permitted warrantless in-
16. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-11, 15-16 (1977); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 478-82 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
17. Some members of the present Court would disagree with the statement in
the text. Justice Rhenquist, for example, apparently rejects the view that
warrants are constitutionally required. Rhenquist recently referred to the
"judicially created preference" for warrants in arguing that "nothing in the
Fourth Amendment itself requires that searches be conducted pursuant to
warrants." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
"The terms of the Amendment simply mandate that the people be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that any warrants which may
issue shall only issue upon probable cause." Id. These views are at odds
with the Court's traditional position. See supra note 16.
For a discussion supporting the Court's traditional view that warrants are
required (not just preferred as a matter of policy) under the fourth amend-
ment, see Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement,
19 Am. Cnpm. L. REV. 603, 613-21 (1982).
18. The police are often perceived as having vested interests in conducting
searches. The magistrate thus acts as a buffer between the police officer, who
is "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," and
the suspect. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Whether or not magistrates are indeed more impartial than police is ques-
tionable. "In the few cases in which warrants are sought, they are usually
issued prefunctorily by magistrates who see their task as merely rubber-
stamping the judgments of law enforcement officers. Indeed, in many cases
the affidavits fied by police officers are not even read." Yackle, The Burger
Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. - RE V. 335, 414 (1978).
19. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 152 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Judge Friendly's dissent at 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1970)).
20. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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trusions under the fourth amendment "in a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions" 2 1 which are supposedly
"jealously and carefully drawn"22 to accommodate only legitimate
societal needs which outweigh the virtues of the rule that a valid
warrant is a prerequisite for a search or seizure.2 3 The automobile
exception has long been recognized as one of the "carefully
drawn" exclusions from the warrant rule.24 As noted above, how-
ever, the drawing, at least prior to Ross, has hardly been careful.
Illustration of the confusion surrounding the automobile excep-
tion can best be grasped by distinguishing two kinds of cases:
those in which police search vehicles and "integral parts" thereof
("automobile searches"), and those in which police search mova-
ble containers carried within vehicles ("container searches").25
This distinction is necessary because the pre-Ross cases granted
considerably more fourth amendment protection to defendants in
container cases, or at least in certain container cases, 26 than to
those whose cases arose in the context of true automobile
searches. 27 Moreover, the automobile/container distinction per-
mits a sequential discussion of the case law since the Court's artic-
ulation of the basic principles for automobile searches historically
precedes its fashioning of the container search doctrine.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
22. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
23. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 393 (1978) (warrantless search of homicide scene unconstitutional absent
exigent circumstances); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)
(search incident to arrest exception to warrant rule inapplicable to warrant-
less search of footlocker already in police control); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (search incident to arrest and automobile
exceptions to warrant rule inapplicable to search of impounded car at police
station).
24. The automobile exception originated with Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), which is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 28-40
infra. The automobile exception is the second oldest of the six or more ex-
ceptions to the warrant rule. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What it is
and What it is Not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L
REV. 987, 988 (1976). Only the search incident to arrest exception predates
the automobile exception. Id.
25. The Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, distinguished searches of "integral parts
of automobiles"--such things as glove boxes, passenger compartments, and
trunks-from searches of mobile containers carried in automobiles, such as
luggage, which are not inherently fixed to automobiles. 442 U.S. at 763-66.
26. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 ("Closed containers" whose contents
are not in plain view are fully protected by the fourth amendment even
though carried in automobiles.).
27. Compare, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search
of concealed compartment under automobile dashboard permitted) which is
discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 42-52 infra, with Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (warrantless search of luggage taken from trunk of
automobile not permitted).
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A. The Automobile Search Doctrine
The Supreme Court first announced a special exception to the
warrant rule for searches of automobiles in the prohibition era
case of Carroll v. United States,28 which held that governmental
law enforcement agents operated within the confines of the fourth
amendment when, acting without warrants but with probable
cause to believe that an automobile contained illegal liquor, they
stopped the car on the highway, uncovered and seized the liquor
hidden in the automobile's upholstery, and arrested the occupants
for illegally transporting intoxicating liquor.29 The Court noted
that while warrants were ordinarily required for searches Gf homes
and other fixed structures, 30 requiring a similar rule for searches of
vehicles would "not [be] practicable . . . because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality."3 1 The rights of automobile
travelers to "free passage"3 2 upon the public highways were not be
be taken lightly, however, and could be overridden only if the
searching officer possessed "probable cause" to believe that vehi-
cles were carrying "contraband or illegal merchandise."33 But
once such probable cause existed, vehicles could be stopped and
searched even if the officer conducting the search lacked authority
to make a warrantless arrest at the time of the stop.34
In focusing on the impracticality of obtaining warrants to
search vehicles given their mobility, the Carroll Court adopted an
"exigent circumstance" exception to the warrant requirement. Be-
28. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
29. For some time federal agents had suspected Carroll of engaging in bootleg-
ging activities in a particular automobile. On several occasions the agents
attempted, but failed, to stop Carroll. Finally, one evening while conducting a
routine patrol of the highway, the agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll
and a companion riding in the automobile in question. The agents stopped
Carroll, searched his car, and found sixty-eight bottles of liquor.
Carroll was charged and convicted of "transporting.. . intoxicating li-
quors in ... [an] automobile," a misdemeanor under federal law. 267 U.S. at
134-36, 144, 164.
30. Id. at 153.
31. Id. at 156.
32. Id. at 154.
33. Id.
34. Although the Carroll Court did not specifically address the issue, the occu-
pants of the car in Carroll probably could not have been arrested prior to the
discovery of the concealed liquor because warrantless arrests for misde-
meanors are generally valid only if the crime is committed "in the presence of
the arresting officer"-a situation non-existent in Carroll until the liquor was
actually discovered. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 511. In any event the Carroll
Court clearly indicated that "the right to search and the validity of the
seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest." 267 U.S. at 158. Thus, the
automobile exception is analytically distinct from the search incident to ar-
rest exception to the warrant rule. See generally, Moylan, supra note 24.
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cause the officers stopped the vehicle in Carroll while it was mov-
ing along the highway, without a realistic opportunity to obtain a
warrant prior to the time of the stop,35 the warrantless search and
seizure was the only way to protect against loss of the evidence
likely to occur through the automobile's mobility. Once stopped,
the officers faced three alternatives: immediately search the car;
seize the occupants in order to secure the car while seeking a
search warrant; or impound the car in order to immobilize it while
seeking a search warrant.36 In permitting the first alternative the
Court did not address the desirability of the other two, presumably
because the second alternative would have been legally impossible
given that the officers lacked authority to arrest the occupants
prior to the search37 and the third alternative might have resulted
in more intrusive invasions of privacy and individual liberty than
would an immediate search. Motorists not possessing contraband
would be on the road again as soon as the immediate search failed
to turn up evidence, instead of experiencing lengthy deprivations
of the use of the car inherent in police attempts to obtain a
warrant.3 8
Absent in Carroll is any discussion that warrantless searches of
automobiles based on probable cause are always permissible. In-
deed, there is reason to believe that had there been a reasonable
opportunity to obtain a warrant prior to the time when the police
encountered the car on the highway, the Court would have invali-
dated the search.39 No exigent circumstance would then have ex-
isted. "In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used."40
The Carroll doctrine lay virtually untouched for forty-five
years4 ' until the Court again addressed the automobile exception
35. See supra note 29; 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 511; Moylan, supra note 24, at
993.
36. Grano, supra note 17, at 641.
37. See supra note 34.
38. Of course, the Court could have fashioned a rule which would have left the
choice of an immediate search or a seizure of the car up to the occupants of
the car themselves. Justice Harlan later argued for just such a rule. Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63-65 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 511.
40. 267 U.S. at 156.
41. The Court's inattention to the automobile exception for so many years is ex-
plained by the fact that many warrantless searches of vehicles were permit-
ted under a liberal search incident to arrest doctrine which rendered the
Carroll rule superfluous. 2 LAFA E, supra note 3, at 511-12. When the Court
imposed stricter requirements for the search incident to arrest rule in Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the automobile exception suddenly became
viable again. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 512.
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in Chambers v. Maroney.42 In Chambers, witnesses to a robbery
informed the police that four robbers were in the process of fleeing
the scene of the crime in a car which the witnesses described in
detail. The informants also provided descriptions of the robbers,
as well as information regarding fruits of the crime carried inside
the vehicle. Within an hour of the alert, police officers observed a
car moving along the highway which answered the witnesses'
description both as to the car itself and as to its four occupants.
The police stopped the car, arrested the occupants, and drove the
car to the police station. Sometime later, they conducted a war-
rantless search of the car at the station and uncovered evidence of
the robbery, later used to convict the defendants, concealed under
the dashboard. In rejecting claims that a fourth amendment viola-
tion had occurred, the Chambers Court looked to Carroll and held
that the combination of probable cause to make the initial stop and
exigent circumstances created through the mobility of the vehi-
cle,43 even after it was taken to the police station, justified the war-
rantless search and seizure.44 The Court found unpersuasive the
argument that the car had been effectively immobilized once it was
secured at the station, thus removing the exigency.45 As Carroll
would permit a warrantless search at the time the car was stopped
on the highway, the Chambers Court saw no different constitu-
tional consequences in seizing the car and delaying the search.4 6
"Given probable cause to search, either [the immediate or delayed
search] ... is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."47
The Chambers Court sought to avoid the notion that probable
42. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
43. "[T]he Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement
for a reasonable search.... Only in exigent circumstances will the judg-
ment of the police as to probable cause serve as sufficient authorization for a
search." 399 U.S. at 51.
44. On the facts before us, the... [car] could have been searched on the
spot when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search
and it was a fleeting target for a search. The probable-cause factor
still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car
unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the
car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In
that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences
between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immo-
bilization until a warrant is obtained.
399 U.S. at 52.
45. Justice Harlan, in his Chambers dissent, found merit in the claim that once
the car had been seized, the police should have obtained a warrant prior to
their search. 399 U.S. 63-65 (Harlan, J. dissenting). See also note 38 and ac-
companying text supra.
46. 399 U.S. at 51-52. See also note 44, supra.
47. Id. at 52.
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cause alone was sufficient to justify warrantless automobile
searches.
Neither Carroll ... nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in
every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable
cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant
affords. But the circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a
particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; more-
over, the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.
Where this is true, as in Carroll and the case before us now, if an effective
search is to be made at any time, either the search must be made immedi-
ately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a
warrant... 48
Notwithstanding such disclaimers, Chambers, with its refusal to
require a warrant once the car had been secured at the station,
severely emasculated the exigent circumstances requirement in
automobile search cases. The exigencies excusing warrantless
searches of vehicles simply do not exist once immobilization oc-
curs.49 Moreover, fourth amendment interests protected by the
warrant requirement remain after justified warrantless seizures of
vehicles occur. While possessory rights to impounded vehicles
may be denied justifiably through a Chambers seizure, owners and
occupants of such vehicles retain privacy interests, deserving the
protection afforded by the warrant process, in personal effects car-
ried within the vehicle.5 0
The incongruity of viewing Chambers as an exigent circum-
stances case has not escaped the Court. Indeed, in retrospect, the
Court now sees Chambers as based, at least in part, on the theory
that persons have only minimal expectations of privacy in their
automobiles, thus rendering searches of automobiles less intrusive
than those of homes or offices.51 On such a view, warrantless inva-
sions of cars, as such, are permissible even in the absence of exi-
48. Id. at 50-51.
49. Many commentators have taken this view. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 17 at
607; Katz, supra note 10, at 565; Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search.
Exception Without Justification, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 134 (1980); Note, The
Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment Principles, 17
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 933, 940 (1980).
50. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 835, 841-45 (1974) (Drivers have three interests at stake in warrantless
stops and searches of their automobiles: an interest in moving on; an interest
in control over their property; and an interest in the secrecy of the car's con-
tents.).
Commentators have argued that police should be required to temporarily
seize vehicles in Chambers situations while search warrants are sought. See,
e.g., Note, supra note 49, at 954. Such a rule might, however, create adminis-
trative difficulties for some police forces which lack personnel or facilities to
effectuate automobile seizures. Requiring a seizure rule in such circum-
stances might, therefore, be undesirable.
51. This view was first expressed in the plurality opinion of Cardwell v. Lewis,
10 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1
gent circumstances if supported by probable cause.52
The requirement of exigency under the automobile exception
did not die an easy death, however. Just one year after Chambers,
the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire53 again tackled an auto-
mobile search case. This time the Court, in a four Justice plural-
ity,54 invalidated a series of warrantless searches of an unoccupied
car seized from the private driveway of a murder suspect's home.
The police had known "for some time" prior to its seizure of the
417 U.S. 583 (1974). In upholding the warrantless examination of the exterior
of defendant's automobile, the Court stated:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because
its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence
or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for
escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both
its occupants and its contents are in plain view .... "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment Protection."
Id. at 590-91.
A majority of the Court later rationalized Chambers in terms of Cardwell's
"lesser expectation of privacy" theory. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
12-13 (1977). The Chadwick Court did not explain how Cardwell's views
about minimal privacy in the exterior of automobiles are equally applicable
to the interior of automobiles as in Chambers. The Court's failure to explain
is especially troubling in light of Cardwell's dicta: 'This is not to say that no
part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the
exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be
free of unreasonable intrusion." 417 U.S. at 591.
52. This interpretation of the meaning of Chambers is bolstered by the Court's
decision in Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam), which upheld the
warrantless station house search of a suspect's car seized with probable
cause from a public street. Unlike the seizure in Chambers, which occurred
at night in a dark area, 399 U.S. at 52 n.10, the seizure in White took place in
broad daylight. The seven Justice majority in White rejected arguments of
dissenting Justices Marshall and Brennen, 423 U.S. at 69, that the darkness in
Chambers created an exigent circumstance which justified removing the car
to the station where a thorough search could take place, while the daylight
conditions in White made possible a thorough search of the car at the point of
initial police encounter, thus eliminating the need to take the car to the police
station. The majority discussed Chambers without mentioning the need for
exigent circumstances: "Chambers ... held that police officers with prob-
able cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could
constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a war-
rant." Id. at 68.
Commentators read White as eliminating any requirement of exigent cir-
cumstances in cases where police have probable cause to search a vehicle
found in a public place. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 10, at 569; Yackle, supra
note 18, at 407.
53. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
54. Justice Stewart wrote the plurality opinion. Joining him were Justices Doug-
las, Brennan, and Marshall. Justice Harlan concurred separately. 403 U.S. at
445, 490. Justices Black, Blackmun, White, and Chief Justice Burger con-
curred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 492, 510.
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probable role played by the car in the crime.5 5 Indeed, the police
had questioned the suspect almost a month prior to the seizure,
thereby alerting him to the fact that he was the target of police
investigation.5 6 Notwithstanding his knowledge of police interest
in him and his car, the suspect and the car were present at his
home when the police finally arrived to make their arrest. Subse-
quent to the arrest of the suspect, the police seized the car and
towed it to the station where it was searched two days later, again
a year later, and, a third time, fourteen months after the seizure.
Vacuum sweepings from the car's interior revealed evidence which
was used to convict the suspect.
The plurality conceded that the police may have had probable
cause to search the car,5 7 but, nevertheless, invalidated the
searches for want of exigency. Unlike Carroll and Chambers
where probable cause arose at or near the moment the cars were
stopped, the police in Coolidge had ample opportunity to obtain a
warrant prior to seizing the car.58 Moreover, the car in Coolidge
was essentially immobilized at the time it was seized. The suspect
was arrested inside the house without the likelihood that anyone
else would remove the car once it was in police custody.5 9 Thus,
contrary to the situations in Carroll and Chambers, "the opportu-
nity for search [in Coolidge] was... hardly 'fleeting.' "60 In reaf-
firming the necessity of warrants in automobile cases where
exigent circumstances are absent, the plurality said:
The word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears. And surely there is nothing in
this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll v.
United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity
on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen
goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even
the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized auto-
mobile. In short, by no possible stretch of the legal imagination can this
be made into a case where "it is not practicable to secure a warrant
"61
Not unexpectedly, dissenting Justices in Coolidge contended
that Chambers controlled. Justices Black and Blackmun argued
that probable cause alone was sufficient to justify the Coolidge
55. 403 U.S. at 460. The Court does not specify exactly when probable cause
arose.
56. Id. at 460.
57. Id. at 458.
58. Id. at 460-62.
59. Id. at 460. The police specifically informed the suspect's wife that she was not
to use the family cars.
60. Id. at 460.
61. Id. at 461-62.
1983]
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seizure and the subsequent searches. 62 The plurality's attempt to
distinguish Chambers on the basis of the car's immobilization in
Coolidge was unsatisfactory to the dissenters who read Chambers
as validating delayed searches in the station house whenever im-
mediate searches at the time of seizure would be permissible.63
While similar in many respects, Chambers and Coolidge differ
in significant ways. In Chambers the police had no opportunity to
obtain a warrant prior to their initial encounter with the robbers,
while in Coolidge the police had probable cause "for some time"
prior to their seizure of the car. Thus, Chambers manifests an exi-
gent circumstance measured "backward in time" from the police
officers' initial encounter with the suspect.64 Chambers' backward
exigency is further manifested by the fact that the car was being
driven by the suspects at the time of the seizure. Coolidge exhib-
its no such exigency. There the car was parked in the place where
it routinely could be found, and the suspect had prior knowledge of
the police investigation but made no attempt to flee.
The Court's rethinking of the automobile exception, however, in
terms of the "lesser expectations of privacy" theory6 5 leaves the
continued vitality of Coolidge in doubt.66 Perhaps the Court would
find that one still possesses sufficient privacy expectations in cars
parked in private driveways to require search warrants even
where police have probable cause to search. On the other hand,
the discussion of Ross to follow gives reason to believe that Coo-
lidge may have been overruled sub silentio.67
Whatever the status of Coolidge, the automobile search cases
leave several unanswered questions. While Chambers makes clear
that police may delay searches of vehicles which they have justifia-
bly seized, the case is unclear about whether warrantless searches
62. Id. at 504, 510 (Black and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
63. Id. at 504. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger would have found Cham-
bers controlling in Coolidge had the detention of the car not been so lengthy.
"Chambers did not authorize indefinite detention of automobiles [justifiably]
seized; it contemplated some expedition in completing the searches so that
automobiles could be released and returned to their owners." Id. at 523
(White, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). "It is
only because of the long detention of the car that I find Chambers inapplica-
ble." Id.
64. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 148 (1980).
65. See supra text accompanying note 51.
66. See 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CoNFESSIONS 11-
10.1-11-11 (2d ed. 1981); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles and the Supreme Court From Carroll to Cardwell: Inconsistency
Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. Rev. 722, 742-47 (1975).
67. See infra notes 186-192 and accompanying text.
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of vehicles held for lengthy perids of time are permissible.68 If
such searches are prohibited,69 the point at which a detention be-
comes unconstitutionally lengthy remains to the established.7 0
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never clarified the extent to
which the automobile exception applies to mobile homes and other
similar vehicles in which people actually live part or all of their
lives. 1 Finally, given its penchant to view automobile searches as
involving minimal invasions of privacy, the Court has left unex-
plained why the fourth amendment governs these cases at all.
Law enforcement practices are not required by the fourth amend-
ment to be reasonable, much less to be based on probable cause,
unless they infringe upon "justifiable reliance [s] on privacy."72 If
significant privacy interests do not attend automobiles, they would
appear to be entirely beyond the protection of the fourth
amendment.73
68. The dissenting Justices in Coolidge split on this issue. Compare the opinions
of Justices Black and White. 403 U.S. at 504, 523. See supra note 63.
69. At least four members of the present Court would likely oppose searches af-
ter lengthy detention of justifiably seized cars. Justice White, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, took that position in Coolidge. See supra note 63. In joining
the Coolidge plurality, Justices Marshall and Brennan adopted the view that
the seizure itself was unjustifiable, and, therefore, the length of the detention
would be irrelevant 403 U.S. at 463 n.20.
70. Where such a line would be drawn is difficult to imagine. Chambers seems to
have rejected a rule that cars may be held only until exigencies excusing ap-
peal to the warrant process no longer exist. See supra notes 45-47 and accom-
panying text.
71. The Court has recognized greater fourth amendment privacy interests in
houses than in cars. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970)
(search warrant required to search home where probable cause to search
arises immediately prior to warrantless search). Similarly, while warrantless
arrests on probable cause are generally permissible outside the home, United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the Court has recently held that absent
exigent circumstances, arrests in the home must be supported by warrants,
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
The lower courts have split in relating the automobile exception to "mo-
bile homes." Compare, e.g., State v. Francoeur, 387 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. App.
1980) (automobile exception applies to camper van even if defendants were
using it for living accommodations), with United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d
1322 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1980) (automobile exception
inapplicable to motor home).
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). For general discussions of the
problem of defining the scope of the fourth amendment, see LaFave, The
Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith," 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 307, 310-12 (1982); Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349, 377-409 (1974).
73. A plurality of the Court made just such a holding in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974), when it found that police examination of the exterior of a car
did not constitute a fourth amendment "search." "With the 'search' limited to
the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings
from the exterior of the car left in the public parking lot, we fail to compre-
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B. The Container Search Doctrine
The Court's difficulties in fashioning an adequate law of auto-
mobile searches were not exhausted with Carroll, Chambers, and
Coolidge. Still to be faced was the problem of searches of mobile
containers carried within vehicles. Assuming that circumstances
justify a warrantless search of a vehicle under Carroll and Cham-
bers, may this search extend to containers found within the car
which might contain the objects sought?
The first container case considered in depth by the Court was
United States v. Chadwick,74 which held that federal officials vio-
lated the fourth amendment by failing to obtain a warrant to
search a locked footlocker which they had lawfully seized from the
open trunk of a parked car. The agents had been notified by of-
ficers from another city that the footlocker likely contained contra-
band75 The suspicions were borne out when a drug-sniffing dog
signaled the presence of a controlled substance within the foot-
locker. Immediately after being alerted by the dog, the agents
placed Chadwick and two colleagues under arrest as the three
were about to drive away after having just lifted the footlocker
hend what expectation of privacy was infringed." 417 U.S. at 591-92. Although
the main thrust of Cardwell was that the fourth amendment simply did not
apply, the plurality nevertheless elaborated on how "reasonable" the search
was under the fourth amendment. "Under circumstances such as these,
where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a
car is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 592. Commen-
tators have attacked Cardwell, calling it "probably the most doctrinally un-
satisfying opinion ever written in the fourth amendment area." Moylan,
supra note 24, at 1049.
Unsatisfying or not, the Court has extended Cardwell's privacy analysis to
searches of interiors of automobiles. See supra note 51. From such an exten-
sion it would seem to follow, at least until the Court tells us otherwise, that if
examinations of automobile exteriors are not "searches," then neither are in-
trusions into interiors of vehicles.
Clearly the Court has yet to follow this logic. The automobile search cases
described in the text of this Article, while deemphasizing the warrant re-
quirement, do require fourth amendment probable cause. Moroever, the
Court has insisted on at least a "reasonable suspicion" under the fourth
amendment to support police stops to check automobile licensing and regis-
tration. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See also South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory search of glove compartment of im-
pounded van reasonable under fourth amendment); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433 (1973) (search of trunk of impounded car conducted to recover le-
gally possessed revolver reasonable under fourth amendment).
74. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
75. Federal agents in San Diego notified their counterparts in Boston that one,
Machado, who matched a proffile used to spot drug traffickers, would be arriv-
ing on the train in Boston with the footlocker. The footlocker was leaking
talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor of marijuana or
hashish. Id. at 3.
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from the sidewalk into the trunk of their car. The agents drove the
car and the still unopened footlocker to the federal building where
it was opened and searched an hour and a half after the arrests.
The search revealed large quantities of marijuana which the gov-
ernment sought to use as evidence against Chadwick and his asso-
ciates. The Supreme Court concluded that although the agents
possessed probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained
contraband,76 once the footlocker was secured at police headquar-
ters and was in their "exclusive control,"77 it could not be searched
without a warrant.
The Court rejected the government's contention that the war-
rant requirement "protects only interests traditionally identified
with the home."78 The Court found "no evidence at all that [the
framers of the Constitution] intended to exclude from protection
of the [Warrant] Clause all searches occurring outside the
home."79 The fourth amendment is meant to "safeguard individu-
als from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy
interests,"80 some of which, the Court found, existed in Chadwick.
In this case, important Fourth Amendment privacy interests were at
76. Probable cause was established in the lower courts and was not contested in
the Supreme Court. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 15. "[W]hen no exigency is shown to support the need for an immedi-
ate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the prop-
erty to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority."
Id.
78. Id. at 6.
Recalling the colonial writs of assistance, which were often executed
in searches of private dwellings, the Government claims that the
Warrant Clause was adopted primarily, if not exclusively in response
to unjustified intrusions into private homes on the authority of gen-
eral warrants. The Government argues there is no evidence that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended to disturb the estab-
lished practice of permitting warrantless searches outside the home,
or to modify the initial clause of the Fourth Amendment by making
warrantless searches supported by probable cause per se unreasona-
ble.
Drawing on its reading of history, the Government argues that
only homes, offices, and private communications implicate interests
which lie at the core of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, it is
only in these contexts that the determination whether a search or
seizure is reasonable should turn on whether a warrant has been ob-
tained. In all other situations, the Government contends, less signifi-
cant privacy values are at stake, and the reasonableness of a
government intrusion should depend solely on whether there is
probable cause to believe evidence of criminal conduct is present.
Where personal effects are lawfully seized outside the home on prob-
able cause, the Government would thus regard searches without a
warrant as not "unreasonable."
Id. at 6-7.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 11.
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stake. By placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker, re-
spondents manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination. No less than one who locks the doors of his
home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal possessions in
this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause. There being no exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government
to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial warrant
provides.8 1
The Chadwick Court also rejected the claim that because the
footlocker was movable personalty, it, like automobiles, was mo-
bile and should, therefore, be exempted from the warrant require-
ment.82 Automobiles, said the Court, were different from other
property. While the automobile exception was based "in part on
[automobile] mobility which often makes obtaining a judicial war-
rant impractical," the Chadwick Court pointed out that prior deci-
sions had sustained "warrantless searches of vehicles in cases in
which the possibilities of the vehicles being removed or evidence
in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent."8 3 Therefore, the
"answer" to the automobile exception doctrine "lies in the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile."8 4
Factors noted by the Chadwick Court evidencing the dimin-
ished expectation of privacy include: automobiles are used for
transportation, not for permanent residence; automobiles travel in
public and expose occupants and contents to the view of others;
automobiles are licensed and regulated in a variety of ways by the
government; automobiles are often taken into police custody in the
interests of public safety.85 Footlockers and luggage, on the other
hand, do not share these diminished privacy characteristics with
cars. Luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects and
its contents are generally closed to public view. "In sum," said the
Chadwick Court, "a person's expectations of privacy in personal
luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile."8 6
The Court's discussion of privacy expectations in automobiles
is troubling. Surely it must come as a surprise to the first time
reader of Chadwick that one relinquishes his/her legitimate pri-
vacy expectations the moment one enters his/her car.87
81. Id.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id. (quoting Cady v. Dambrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Just how the ... Court has arrived at the conclusion that
automobiles are not private is anything but clear ... At best, the
Justices merely describe what they perceive to be true of American
life; they rely upon their sense of prevailing attitudes about
automobiles. Less well-placed Americans are simply told what pri-
vacy they do or do not expect in their cars, that is, what expectations
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[T] he Court's assertion that cars are not repositories of personal belong-
ings defies common sense. Cars, like footlockers, are used to transport
personal possessions. One's most private possessions, such as books, doc-
uments, diaries, photographs, and letters, and one's most valuable prop-
erty, such as jewelry, invariably wind up in one's car at one point or
another. Moreover, people frequently leave valuables in glove compart-
ments and trunks while temporarily away from the car. One need only
think of freeway service plazas to realize how much people depend upon
the security of a locked car for the protection of valuable possessions. In-
deed, an unattended, locked automobile undoubtedly provides more se-
curity for possessions than an unattended, locked suitcase or footlocker.88
Moreover, simply because automobiles are licensed and regulated
by the government, it hardly follows that privacy expectations are
justifiably relinquished. The government regulates housing
through extensive health and safety regulations without reducing
the home owner's privacy expectations in the entire house.89
The government did not argue in Chadwick that the footlock-
er's brief contact with the car brought the case within the doctrine
of Carroll/Chambers.90 Justice Blackmun's and Justice Rhen-
quist's dissent did, however, pose an interesting question: If the
of privacy are reasonable or legitimate. Not only is the analysis sus-
picious insofar as it is grounded in changing public attitudes, but the
Justices' ability to ascertain those attitudes at any point is open to
serious question. What of the family that lives in a mobile home or,
at least during the month of August, in a recreational vehicle? What
of the traveling salesperson who leaves his or her sample case, dirty
socks, and old love letters in the backseat of the company sedan
parked outside the motel? What of the rest of us who live in over-
crowded apartments where the television set is always blasting, the
phone is always ringing, and the kids are always screaming? If we
leave it all for a pleasant evening drive, who are the Justices to say
that by doing so we leave our expectations of privacy behind? The
truth is we often seek privacy on wheels.
Yackle, supra note 18, at 410-11. See also Katz, supra note 10, at 570.
88. Grano, Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment Issues:
Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement,
69 J. Cumn. L. & CRm~hIOLOGY 425, 460 (1978).
89. [T] he Court has not proved its claim that expectations of privacy are
lower in automobiles than in most other places. Automobiles are in-
deed regulated, but the fact that police may examine license plates,
inspection stickers, headlights, exhaust systems, and other such
things hardly proves that one has a reduced expectation of privacy in
items held in the glove compartment, under the seat, or in the trunk.
Similarly, the fact that an automobile travels public thoroughfares
hardly proves that one has a reduced expectation of privacy against
governmental prying into concealed areas. [Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)] seems to teach the very opposite: neither
governmental regulation nor an individual's limited disclosures of
some aspects of an activity give government a right of warrantless
carte blanche access to all the rest. Expectations of privacy are not
so easily diminished.
Grano, supra note 88, at 459-60.
90. 433 U.S. at 11.
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agents had postponed the arrest just a few minutes longer until
Chadwick and his colleagues had begun to drive away, could the
car have been seized, taken to the agents' office, and had all of its
contents, footlocker included, searched without a warrant?9 1
While the dissenters answered the question in the affirmative, a
majority of the court would take a different view three years later
in Arkansas v. Sanders.92
Sanders dealt with facts similar to Chadwick except this time a
piece of luggage, which the police had probable cause to believe
contained marijuana, was carried in the trunk of a taxicab in which
Sanders was a passenger.93 After observing Sanders place the
suitcase in the trunk of the cab and begin to drive away, the police
stopped the taxicab and ordered the driver to open the trunk. The
driver complied and the police immediately conducted a warrant-
less search of the unlocked suitcase which revealed a large quanti-
ty of marijuana which was later used as evidence against Sanders.
No exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search once the
police had placed the suitcase under their control.94
The issue facing the Supreme Court was whether the automo-
bile exception covered the Sanders situation, thus excusing the
warrantless search, or whether Chadwick's exclusive control doc-
trine invalidated the intrusion.9 5 The Court saw Sanders falling on
the Chadwick side of the line. Like the footlocker in Chadwick,
the luggage in Sanders carried an "expectation of privacy" which
could not be invaded without a warrant once police had the item
within their "exclusive control."96 Thus, the officers should have
obtained a warrant after securing the suitcase.97 While such a rule
obtains for containers within cars, the Sanders Court sought to
avoid a similar requirement where the vehicle itself is to be
searched under the automobile exception. Requiring that vehicles
be held until a search warrant could be obtained would burden
"police departments of all sizes around the country to have avail-
able the people and equipment necessary to transport impounded
automobiles to some central location . . . where they could be
kept, with due regard to the safety of the vehicles and their con-
91. 433 U.S. at 17, 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
92. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
93. The police were informed by a "reliable informant" that Sanders would arrive
on an American Airlines flight at the Little Rock Airport. Sanders would be
carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. As predicted, Sanders ar-
rived at the airport and claimed a green suitcase which he put in the trunk.
Id. at 755-56, 761.
94. Id. at 756, 762.
95. Id. at 757.
96. Id. at 762.
97. Id. at 762, 763, 766.
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tents until a magistrate ruled on the [warrant] application." 98
The Sanders Court found the automobile exception and its poli-
cies inapposite in the context of the search of the suitcase. Al-
though the suitcase, like the taxicab, was mobile while it remained
in the vehicle's trunk, "the exigency of mobility must be assessed
at the point immediately before the search,"99 which in this case
came after the police had seized the object and had it securely
within their control. "Once police have seized a suitcase.., the
extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from which
it was taken.... [A] s a general rule there is no greater need for
warrantless searches of luggage taken from automobiles than of
luggage taken from other places."loo
Moreover, while lesser expectations of privacy may attend cars
and "integral parts" thereof,101 the same is not true of luggage car-
ried in automobiles.
One is not less inclined to place private, personal possessions in a suitcase
merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather than
transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for personal items
when one wishes to transport them. Accordingly, the reasons for not re-
quiring a warrant for the search of an automobile do not apply to searches
of personal luggage taken by police from automobiles. We therefore find
no justification for the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the warrant-
less search of one's personal luggage merely because it was located in an
automobile lawfully stopped by the police.1
02
The Sanders Court attempted, however, to limit the scope of its
holding by dropping the now famous footnote thirteen:
0 3
Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a
98. Id. at 765-66 n.14. The view expressed in the text has been criticized by Judge
Wilkey in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (en banc):
With all due respect, this explanation of impracticality is itself
most impractical and theoretical. For surely we can assume that any
police department, no matter how small or rural, can transport and
impound vehicles illegally parked or abandoned in hazardous loca-
tions. Tow trucks are available everywhere and it is a common expe-
rience that police are prepared to resort to them. A "boot" on one
wheel and one officer to watch over the car would be entirely suffi-
cient to preserve immobile the auto and its contents. The Supreme
Court apparently believes, however, that some small police depart-
ments may not be able to supply whatever additional resources are
necessary to establish a chain of custody sufficient to secure not only
a vehicle but evidence within against tampering while a warrant is
sought.
Id. at 1200.
99. 442 U.S. at 763.
100. Id. at 763-64.
101. Id. at 761-763.
102. Id. at 764-65.
103. Professor LaFave describes footnote 13 as a "type of container exception to
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search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their
very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly,
in some cases the contents of a package will be open to "plain view,"
thereby obviating the need for a warrant .... There will be difficulties in
determining which parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for
their search and which do not. Our decision in this case means only that a
warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched
and that the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers
and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an
automobile. 10 4
The last quoted sentence leaves open the question of whether such
things as paper bags or cardboard cartons are covered by the Sand-
ers rule even after such items come under the exclusive control of
the police.105 Not surprisingly, the lower courts encountered im-
mediate problems relating Sanders to situations where non-lug-
gage containers are legally seized from automobiles, secured by
the police, and then subsequently searched. 0
6
Another question unanswered by Sanders concerns the appli-
cation of the warrant requirement to situations where police have
probable cause to believe that evidence is concealed somewhere
Sanders." 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at 153 (Supp. 1982). See generally, id., at
148-159.
104. 442 U.S. at 764 n.13.
105. "Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be litigated, are the briefcase,
the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind of container."
442 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun and Rhenquist, JJ., dissenting). Justices Black-
mun and Rhenquist would have upheld the Sanders search under the auto-
mobile exception because "[t]he luggage, like the automobile transporting it,
is mobile" and "the expectation of privacy in a suitcase found in the car is
probably not significantly greater than the expectation of privacy in a locked
glove compartment or trunk." Id. at 769. "Given the significant encroach-
ment on privacy interests entailed by a seizure of personal property, the ad-
ditional protection provided by a search warrant may well be regarded as
incidental." Id. at 770.
After detailing a series of hypothetical cases whose resolution is unclear
under the majority opinion, the Sanders dissenters opted for a "clear-cut
rule": Warrants should not be required to seize and search any personal
property found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched
without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers. Id. at 772.
106. Compare, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 62 Hawaii 660, 619 P.2d 108 (1980) (Sanders
applicable to knapsack with buckles, zipper, and flap), with State v. Schrier,
283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979) (Sanders not applicable to knapsack with a latch
but whose flaps could be pushed aside revealing contents). See also the
cases cited at 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 149 n.102.3 (Supp. 1982); Comment,
Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton: The Supreme Court Opens Car
Doors to Container Searches, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 291, 298 n.67 (1982), for cases
illustrating the lower court confusion in applying the fourth amendment on a
"container by container" basis; see generally, Note, Warrantless Container
Searches Under the Automobile and Search Incident Exceptions, 9 FoRDHAm
URB. L.J. 185 (1980).
[Vol. 62:1
1983] AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 21
within a car, but, unlike the situation in Sanders, do not know
whether it is concealed in a specific container or, for that matter, in
any container at all.107 In those circumstances, when police stop a
car and find a container therein, may they search the container im-
mediately under Chambers or must they secure the container
while a warrant is obtained under Sanders? Should the answer to
this question depend upon the kind of container discovered or
should the automobile exception apply in all such cases thus
avoiding the necessity of crating "downtown" all the containers
within the vehicle which might possibly embody the evidence
sought?
Some temporary answers to these questions came in the
Court's short-lived opinion in Robbins v. California,lO8 which held
that the police violated the fourth amendment when, without a
warrant, they searched two packages wrapped in green opaque
plastic which had been discovered in the trunk of a car that had
been stopped for a traffic offense. The initial stop of the car oc-
curred because police observed the driver, Robbins, driving errati-
cally. Once stopped, Robbins exited his car and walked towards
the officers who asked to see his driver's license and the car's reg-
istration. After Robbins fumbled with his wallet, a police officer
opened the car door to obtain the registration and immediately
smelled marijuana smoke. An officer patted-down Robbins and
discovered a vial of liquid. The officers then secured Robbins in
the patrol car, opened the luggage compartment of the car, and dis-
107. In their concurring opinion in Sanders, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Ste-
vens specifically note that Sanders did not deal with the issue discussed in
the text. They point out that the police had probable cause to believe that the
suitcase contained marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab.
442 U.S. at 766 (Burger, C.., concurring).
Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported by re-
spondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was
being carried, that was the suspected locus of the contraband. The
relationship between the automobile and the contraband was purely
coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase was resting
in the trunk of the automobile at the time of respondent's arrest does
not turn this into an "automobile" exception case ....
This case simply does not present the question of whether a war-
rant is required before opening luggage when the police have prob-
able cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in the vehicle,
but when they do not know whether, for example, it is inside a piece
of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in
some part of the car's structure. I am not sure whether that would be
a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant to search the suit-
case when a warrantless search of the automobile is otherwise
permissible.
Id. at 767-68.
108. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). Robbins was overruled less than a year later in United
States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982).
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covered and immediately unwrapped the packages wrapped in
opaque plastic. The packages contained marijuana which was
later used to convict Robbins for violating drug laws. Robbins ap-
pealed and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to re-
solve the "continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers
found during a lawful warrantless search of an automobile may
themselves be searched without a warrant." 0 9
Robbins did not command a majority of the Court. A four Jus-
tice plurality opinion authored by Justice Stewart found that Sand-
ers and Chadwick controlled the Robbins situation.11 0 "Those
cases made clear ... that a closed piece of luggage found in a law-
fully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent
as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else.""' The con-
tents of Chadwick's footlocker and Sander's luggage were immune
because they had been placed in a "closed, opaque container,"
which manifested a "reasonable expectation" that "the contents
would remain free from public examination."" 2 Likewise, Robbins
and his packages received the protection of the warrant rule, foot-
note thirteen of Sanders"3 notwithstanding. "[T]he negative im-
plication of footnote 13... is that unless the container is such that
its contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment.""
4
The plurality's "opaque container" doctrine had the virtue of
being a relatively clear rule avoiding the necessity of a container
109. 453 U.S. at 423.
110. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined Justice Stewart in the plural-
ity. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell concurred separately. Justice
Powell voiced specific reservations with the plurality opinion, see infra notes
117-119 and accompanying text; the Chief Justice concurred in the judgment
in Robbins without stating his reasons for refusing to join the plurality
opinion.
111. 453 U.S. at 425.
112. Id. at 426 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1976)).
113. See supra text accompanying note 103.
114. 453 U.S. at 427. Prior to reaching the Supreme Court, the California Court of
Appeals had found that the packages in Robbins fell directly under the rule
prescribed in footnote 13 since "[a] ny experienced observer could have in-
ferred from the appearance of the packages that they contained bricks of ma-
rijuana." Id. This conclusion was virtually unsupported by evidence and
rejected by the Supreme Court plurality:
Expectations of privacy are established by general social norms, and
to fall within the second exception of the footnote in question a
container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its dis-
tinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its con-
tents are obvious to an observer. If indeed a green plastic wrapping
reliably indicates that a package could only contain marihuana, that
fact was not shown by the evidence of record in this case.
Id. at 428.
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by container inquiry into respective privacy expectations.115
Moreover, the rule respected subjective privacy expectations while
paying homage to the traditional view that magistrates must de-
cide when privacy rights give way to law enforcement interests.116
Despite these virtues, Justice Powell, while concurring in the
Robbins result, objected to the plurality's bright line approach,
favoring, instead, a rule which would distinguish constitutionally
"insubstantial containers"ll 7 from containers which embody sig-
nificant privacy interests."18 Without such a distinction, Justice
Powell believed heavy and unnecessary costs to law enforcement
interests would be incurred.
While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even pur-
port to protect any privacy interest, it would impose substantial new bur-
dens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigarbox or a Dixie cup in
the course of a probable-cause search of an automobile for narcotics, the
conscientious policeman would be required to take the object to a magis-
trate, fill out the appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain
the warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the
warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the officer from
his normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and effort, drawn from
the public's limited resources for detecting or preventing crimes, is justi-
fied when it protects an individual's reasonable privacy interests. In my
view, the plurality's requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate
burden of procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to
search the most trivial container may be heavy and will not be compen-
sated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment values. The
sole virtue of the plurality's rule is simplicity. 1 19
Three separate dissenters filed opinions in Robbins.12o The dis-
senters were in agreement, however, on the general solution to the
Robbins problem: extend the automobile exception to cover all
the contents of cars falling under the exception. "[A] warrant
should not be required to seize and search any personal property
found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched
without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers."'2 ' As with
the plurality rule, the dissenters' position would provide a bright
line solution to the container search problem. Instead of subject-
115. 453 U.S. at 429 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). "[T]he plurality's rule provides a
standard that is relatively simple to apply in a variety of situations." Com-
ment, supra note 106, at 302. For a view on the reach of that bright line rule,
see Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Robbins. 453 U.S. at 429 n.1.
116. 453 U.S. at 301-02.
117. Id. at 429 (Powell, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 429, 433-34.
119. Id. at 433-34.
120. See the dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun, Rhenquist, and Stevens
respectively, 453 U.S. at 436, 437, 444.
121. 453 U.S. at 436-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753, 772 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Justices Rhenquist and
Stevens expressed similar views at 453 U.S. at 441 and 446-47 respectively.
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ing virtually all closed containers to the rigors of the warrant re-
quirement, as the plurality would have it, the dissenters would
subject none.
Justice Stevens argued in his dissenting opinion that permit-
ting the Robbins search under the automobile exception would not
be inconsistent with either Chadwick or Sanders because neither
of those cases involved the automobile exception.122 In neither
case did the police have probable cause to search an automobile.
Probable cause existed to search the footlocker and suitcase re-
spectively. In automobile exception cases, however, Justice Ste-
vens- contended:
The scope of any search that is within the exception should be just as
broad as a magistrate could authorize by warrant if he were on the scene;
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement therefore justifies
neither more nor less than could a magistrate's warrant. If a magistrate
issued a search warrant for an automobile, and officers in conducting the
search authorized by the warrant discovered a suitcase in the car, they
surely would not need to return to the magistrate for another warrant
before searching the suitcase. The fact that the marijuana found in peti-
tioner's car was wrapped in opaque green plastic does not take the search
out of the automobile exception.
1 2 3
Although only a plurality opinion, Robbins went a long way to-
ward settling the container search doctrine. However, much of
what Robbins settled was simultaneously unsettled by the Court's
opinion in New York v. Belton,124 delivered the same day as Rob-
bins. Belton dealt with the problem of defining the scope of per-
missible warrantless searches incident to arrests made while the
arrestee is in an automobile. The facts of Belton were similar to
Robbins. A police officer stopped a speeding car, carrying Belton
and three associates. The officer immediately detected the odor of
burnt marijuana and observed an envelope marked "Supergold"
which the officer associated with marijuana. He therefore ordered
the four men out of the car and placed them under arrest for un-
lawful possession of marijuana. After separating the four men and
patting them down, the officer collected the envelope, opened it
and discovered marijuana inside. The officer then searched the
passenger compartment of the car, found Belton's leather jacket
on the back seat, unzipped one of the jacket pockets and discov-
ered a quantity of cocaine. Belton conceded the legality of the ini-
tial stop and the search of the envelope,125 but contended that his
fourth amendment rights were violated when the jacket was
searched without a warrant. The Supreme Court ultimately dis-
122. 453 U.S. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note
107.
123. 453 U.S. at 448-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
125. 453 U.S. at 462.
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agreed, holding that warrantless searches of containers found
within the "passenger area" of automobiles are permissible if the
arrestee has been lawfully arrested while in the automobile.1
26
The Court found that containers in such circumstances are neces-
sarily "within the arrestee's immediate control."127 Unless granted
power to immediately secure areas within the arrestee's control,
arresting officers would risk personal danger-the arrestee might
seek to use a weapon to resist arrest or effect an escape-and face
the possibility that the arrestee would conceal or destroy
evidence.1
28
Because its rationale is premised on the search incident to ar-
rest exception to the warrant rule, Belton is neither an automobile
exception case nor a Chadwick/Sanders container case. Neverthe-
less, the Belton Court said that arrests in automobiles had histori-
cally posed special recurring problems for courts faced with the
task of defining the scope of permissible searches incident to ar-
rest. 29 As of the time of Belton, "no straightforward rule" had
emerged in determining "whether, in the course of a search inci-
dent to a lawful custodial arrest of the occupants of an automobile,
police may search inside the automobile after the arrestees are no
longer in it.1130 While the Court had previously confined the inci-
dent to arrest exception to "the area within the immediate control
of the arrestee,"' 31 application of that standard was especially diffi-
cult in cases where that area arguably included the interior of an
automobile and the arrestee was its recent occupant.132 Therefore,
the Belton Court found it necessary to fashion a workable rule to
inform citizens of their constitutional rights and to clearly define
the scope of police authority. 33 This rule must take into account
the Court's finding that "articles inside the relatively narrow com-
pass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact
126. Id. at 460.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 457. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court had earlier
held that lawful custodial arrests create a situation which justifies a contem-
poraneous warrantless search of the person arrested and of the immediately
surrounding area. The underlying rationale of the incident to arrest excep-
tion is the need "to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape," and the need to prevent the con-
cealment or destruction of evidence. Id. at 763.
129. 453 U.S. at 458-59. Apart from noting that lower courts often reached conflict-
ing results, the Court did not explain why arrests in automobiles were so dif-
ficult to accommodate under the incident to arrest doctrine.
130. Id. at 459. The Court noted that some lower court cases had upheld warrant-
less searches of arrestees after they had abandoned their vehicles, while
other cases had denied the validity of such searches.
131. Id. at 460.
132. Id.
133. Id at 459-60.
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generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an ar-
restee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
ite[m].' "134 With these considerations in mind, the Court stated
its rule: "[W] hen a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile," and examine the contents of any containers found
therein, regardless of the likelihood that the container actually
holds a weapon or evidence of criminal conduct.1
35
Justice Stevens concurred in the Belton result but argued that
the search should have been upheld under the automobile excep-
tion rather than under the search incident theory.136 Noting that
the majority's rule would apparently apply to arrests for even the
most petty offenses where the-police had no reason to believe evi-
dence was contained in the automobile, Stevens contended that
Belton would grant a license to search far exceeding the scope per-
mitted by the automobile exception.
Under the Court's new rule, the arresting officer may find reason to [take
the driver into custody and thereby obtain justification for a search of the
entire interior of the automobile] whenever he sees an interesting looking
briefcase or package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic
violation.
13 7
Of course such an extensive search would be precluded under the
automobile exception unless the officer had probable cause to be-
lieve that the car contained contraband or other evidence.138
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in a dissenting opinion in
Belton, arguing that the majority had unnecessarily expanded the
scope of the incident to arrest exception by adopting the fictions
that "the interior of a car is always within the immediate control of
an arrestee who has recently been in the car,"139 and that contain-
ers in the passenger compartment, whether locked or unlocked,
are always within the reach of the arrestee.140 The privacy inter-
ests so painstakingly preserved by the Court in cases like Chad-
wick and Sanders thus appeared to the dissenters to be at the
mercy of Belton's "dangerous precedent" which permitted war-
rantless searches of passenger compartments even where no
threat of danger to the arresting officer or of loss of evidence ex-
isted.141 Moreover, the dissenters found the majority's bright line
134. Id. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
135. Id. at 460-61.
136. Id. at 444-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting in Robbins and concurring in Belton).
137. Id. at 452.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 468.
141. Id. at 466-68. The dissenters found that Belton could not possibly have gained
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rule far from radiant. What, for example, did the majority mean by
its limitation of Belton to the "passenger compartment" of the ve-
hicle? Did the limitation include locked glove compartments, the
interior of door panels, or the area under the floorboards?142 How
should the requirement that the search be "contemporaneous"
with the arrest be interpreted? Is a search five minutes after the
arrestee has left the car "contemporaneous" enough?143 Thirty
minutes? Finally, the dissenters feared that Belton would signal
the beginning of a general expansion of the incident to arrest ex-
ception beyond the concerns it was tailored to address. Why,
asked the dissenters, is the Belton rule limited in principle to
searches of cars?144
There is much to be said for the dissenters' concerns. The ma-
jority never explained exactly why it was necessary to pigeonhole
vehicles into a special category for purposes of the incident to ar-
rest exception. The distinction between automobile and
nonautomobile contexts thus appears to be based more on judicial
flat than on sound principle.145 Moreover, as noted by Justice Ste-
vens and others,14 6 Belton's search incident power is not premised
on probable cause to search and is, thus, far broader than the
power to search under the automobile exception.1
4 7
The tension between Robbins and Belton is clear. Although the
Court granted protection to privacy interests associated with
closed opaque containers in Robbins, it stripped away much of that
protection in Belton.
To the extent that Belton permits warrantless searches of containers be-
yond the point justified by the rationales for the search incident to arrest
exception, Belton also authorizes invasions of the same privacy interests
for which Robbins requires fourth amendment protection. By allowing po-
lice to search closed opaque containers incident to an arrest, even in the
access to his jacket at the time of his arrest. He was outside the car at the
time the police officer entered the car and searched the jacket.
142. Id. at 469-70.
143. Id. at 470.
144. "[F]or a search to be valid under the Fourth Amendment, it must be 'strictly
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation per-
missible."' Id. at 464.
The dissenters' fears that Belton might be extended beyond the context of
automobile arrests appear to be borne out by United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d
585 (D.C. Cir. 1982) which holds that the Belton rationale applies to any
search incident to an arrest, regardless of whether a vehicle is involved. The
Brown court holds that containers, there a small, zippered leather pouch,
within the reach of a suspect when he is arrested may be searched, without a
warrant, contemporaneous with the arrest.
145. Grano, supra note 17, at 611 n.48.
146. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see also Grano, supra note 17,
at 613; Katz, supra note 10.
147. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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absence of probable cause to believe that the containers hold weapons or
evidence, the Court, in Belton, ignores Robbins' recognitions of the legiti-
mate privacy interest associated with such containers.
14 8
Moreover, the practical application of Robbins and Belton yields
unprincipled results. In most cases, when a police officer can con-
duct a search pursuant to the automobile exception, the probable
cause supporting the search will also support an arrest of the occu-
pant of the automobile, thereby creating an overlap of automobile
and incident to arrest exceptions.149 Under the automobile excep-
tion, police may search the interior of the car and, apparently, also
such "integral parts" as the trunk.o5 0 Robbins precludes opening
any opaque closed container found anywhere in the car. If the
search is incident to an arrest, however, Belton authorizes the
opening of containers found in the passenger compartment but not
in the trunk.' 5' Thus at least so far as container searches are con-
cerned, the trunk of the car has been blessed by the Court as a
special fourth amendment sanctuary. No apparent principle ex-
plains why a locked suitcase in the back seat of the car may be
searched without a warrant but one placed in the trunk may not.
With such anomalies no doubt firmly in mind, as well as dissat-
isfaction with its earlier inability to generate a majority opinion,
the Court decided to reconsider Robbins.152 The stage was thus set
for United States v. Ross.
III. THE ROSS CASE
A. The Facts
Ross deals with a variation of the Robbins theme. A reliable
informant notified police officers that an individual known as "Ban-
148. Comment, supra note 106, at 313.
149. Id. at 314.
150. The Court has never explicitly held that trunks of cars may be opened under
the automobile exception. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 437 (1973), per-
mitted the warrantless opening of a car trunk to search for a legally pos-
sessed revolver. The search in Cady was motivated by a caretaking concern
by the police and not by a desire to obtain evidence. Moreover, "probable
cause" to search the trunk was lacking in Cady. Moylan, supra note 24, at
1012. See also Note, supra note 66, at 758. Sanders, however, states that the
automobile doctrine extends to "integral parts" of the vehicle. 442 U.S. at 761,
763. Seemingly, if the automobile exception permits tearing apart the interior
of the car, as in Carroll, it also permits opening a closed or even locked trunk.
151. The Belton Court explicitly excluded the trunk from the scope of its passen-
ger compartment rule. 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4.
152. 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981). With a change in judicial personnel from the time Rob-
bins was originally decided, the Court likely saw an increased prospect for a
concensus of the Justices upon reconsideration of the case. Justice Stewart,
the author of the Robbins plurality had retired and had been replaced by Jus-
tice O'Connor.
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dit," who later turned out to be Albert Ross, was selling narcotics
kept in the trunk of a car parked at a specified address. The in-
formant provided the police with a detailed description of both
"Bandit" and the car from which he was dealing. The basis for the
informant's information was first hand observation of a drug sale
and a direct assurance from "Bandit" that more drugs were in the
car's trunk. Acting on this information, three police officers drove
to the specified address, discovered a parked car matching the
description provided by the informant, obtained a license check
which disclosed that the car belonged to Ross, and received a com-
puter check on Ross which revealed that he often assumed the
alias, "Bandit." Finding no one matching the description given by
the informant, the police briefly left the area where the car was
parked in order to avoid alerting people on the street. Five min-
utes later, the three officers returned and observed that the car
under suspicion was being driven down the street by a man match-
ing the description given by the informant. The police stopped the
car and ordered the driver, Ross, out of the vehicle. The police
then searched Ross and the interior of the car. The latter search
turned up a bullet on the car's front seat and a pistol in the glove
compartment. The police arrested and handcuffed Ross, opened
the trunk of his car, and found a closed brown paper bag which
they immediately opened. The bag contained glassine bags of
white powder, later determined to be heroin. The police replaced
the bag, closed the trunk and drove the car to police headquarters
where a subsequent search of the car revealed a zippered red
pouch containing $3200 in cash. No warrant was obtained.
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute. Over his objection, the heroin and the currency were in-
troduced into evidence and Ross was convicted.
Ross appealed, contending that his fourth amendment rights
had been violated by the warrantless search of the bag and pouch.
After an en banc decision of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals had invalidated both the search of the paper bag and of the
pouch, 5 3 the United States Supreme Court granted the govern-
ment's petition for certiorari and invited "the parties to address
the question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsid-
ered."154 The Court's invitation to reconsider Robbins was moti-
vated by a desire to achieve "clarification in this area of the law,'' 55
153. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
154. 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
155. 102 S. Ct. 2161-62. "Clarification" was necessary because the Robbins opinion
commanded only a four Justice plurality of the Court and Chief Justice Bur-
ger's silent concurrence in Robbins left his position unclear. See Katz, supra
note 10, at 577-80.
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an area of vital importance to law enforcement and civil liberties
interests alike. The Court stated that "it is not uncommon for po-
lice officers to have probable cause to believe that contraband may
be found in a stopped vehicle. In every such case a conflict is
presented between the individual's constitutionally protected in-
terest in privacy and the public interest in effective law
enforcement."1 56
B. The Holding
Probable cause clearly existed in Ross.157 Thus, the initial stop
and search of the car's interior and the opening of the trunk and
seizure of the bag and pouch were justified under the automobile
exception.'- The issue in Ross was whether the closed paper bag
and zippered pouch could be opened and searched without a war-
rant given that the police had lawfully seized the items from the
trunk with a probable cause belief that contraband was concealed
somewhere therein. In upholding the search of the bag and pouch,
and abandoning the recent opaque container rule of the Robbins
plurality,1 5 9 the Court adopted Justice Stevens' position in his Rob-
bins dissent: "If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle
and its contents that may conceal the object of the search."16 0
C. Rationale
The Court, with Justice Stevens writing the opinion joined by
five other Justices,161 began its analysis by extensive reference to
Carroll which the Court read to stand for the proposition that war-
156. 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
157. Id. at 2168 n.22. The finding of probable cause made by the Court of Appeals
was not disputed in the Supreme Court.
The en banc Court of Appeals stated that "[b] ased on the tip the
police received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched, and
the pouch and bag were properly seized." The court explained:
"[W] e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable
cause to stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied
accurate information on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness to
sales of narcotics by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take narcot-
ics from the trunk of his car in making a sale and heard him say he
possessed additional narcotics." The court further noted that "[in
this case, the informant told the police that Ross had narcotics in the
trunk of his car. No specific container was identified."
Id. (citations omitted).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2172.
160. Id. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
161. Joining Justice Stevens in the majority opinion were Justices Blackmun,
Powell, O'Conner, Rhenquist, and Chief Justice Burger.
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rantless searches of vehicles are constitutionally permissible if
supported by probable cause.162 The Court made no mention of an
exigent circumstance requirement. While noting that automobile
mobility provided the historical rationale for the automobile ex-
ception,163 the Court failed to suggest that actual mobility is a nec-
essary condition for application of the automobile exception. 6 4
The Court next examined the Chadwick and Sanders cases
pointing out that in neither "did the police have probable cause to
search the vehicle or anything in it except the footlocker in [Chad-
wick] and the suitcase in [Sanders].'"165 These cases were distin-
guishable from Robbins and Ross in which suspicion was not
directed at a specific container prior to the time of the container's
search. Thus in Robbins and Ross, as in Carroll and Chambers, a
magistrate could have issued a warrant to search the entire car,
including secondary containers therein.166 Therefore, "[t] he scope
of the search[es] [in those cases] was no greater than a magistrate
could have authorized by issuing a warrant based on the probable
cause that justified the search."' 67 The Court elaborated:
It would be illogical to assume that the outcome of Chambers--or the out-
come of Carroll itself-would have been different if the police had found
the secreted contraband enclosed within a secondary container and had
opened that container without a warrant. If it was reasonable for prohibi-
tion agents to rip open the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have
been reasonable for them to look into a burlap sack stashed inside; if it
was reasonable to open the concealed compartment in Chambers, it would
have been equally reasonable to open a paper bag crumpled within it. A
contrary rule could produce absurd results inconsistent with the decision
162. 102 S. Ct. at 2164. "[T]he exception to the warrant requirement established in
Carroll... applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by prob-
able cause." Id.
163. [S]ince its earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticabil-
ity of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of con-
traband goods. It is this impracticability, viewed in historical
perspective, that provided the basis for the Carroll decision. Given
the nature of an automobile in transit, the Court recognized that an
immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the
illicit substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrant-
less search of an automobile is not unreasonable.
Id. at 2163 (footnotes omitted).
164. While Carroll may have originally been premised on an exigent circumstance
theory, see supra note 163, the Ross Court aparently now sees it as supporting
warrantless searches of automobiles on probable cause alone. "Carroll...
applies ... to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause. In
this class of cases a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would
justify the issuance of a warrant." 102 S. Ct. at 2164.
165. 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
166. Id. at 2167, 2170. "A warrant to search a vehicle would support a search of
every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of the search." Id. at
2170.




The Court believed Carroll was based on 'practical considera-
tions... which would be largely nullified if the permissible scope
of a warrantless search of an automobile did not include contain-
ers and packages found inside the vehicle."' 69 While the Court no-
where specifically explained what these "practical considerations"
were, it did drop a footnote explaining how its new rule permitting
warrantless searches of secondary containers would actually have
the effect of restricting invasions of privacy.
The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search of an
automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the automobile and
its contents has been completed. Arguably, the entire vehicle itself (in-
cluding its upholstery) could be searched without a warrant, with all
wrapped articles and containers found during that search then taken to a
magistrate. But prohibiting police from opening immediately a container
in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and instead
forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the
intrusion on privacy interests. Moreover, until the container itself was
opened the police could never be certain that the contraband was not se-
creted in a yet undiscovered portion of the vehicle; thus in every case in
which a container was found, the vehicle would need to be secured while a
warrant was obtained. Such a requirement would be directly inconsistent
with the rationale supporting the decisions in Carroll and Chambers.
170
The Court alluded to another "practical consideration" which
would be threatened by a warrant requirement in cases like Ross.
Contraband carried in cars is generally enclosed in a secondary
container of some kind.171 Although the Court did not explain how
this fact supposedly affected the practicality of applying the war-
rant rule,172 perhaps it had in mind the administrative inconven-
ience entailed in seizing and securing all the car's containers while
seeking a warrant. 73 If this was indeed the Court's concern, it
never explained why and how administrative inconvenience was
thought to override the privacy interests in the containers.
Regarding privacy interests in containers found within vehicles
legally searchable under the automobile exception, the Court had
little to say except to note that "the privacy interests in a car's
trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a movea-
ble container."' 74 The Court thus suggested that a permissible
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2170.
170. Id. at 2171 n.28.
171. Id. at 2170.
172. The Court did point out that "since its earliest days Congress had recognized
the impracticality of securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation
of contraband goods." Id. at 2163.
173. Justice Powell expressed this concern in his Robbins concurrence. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text.
174. 102 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
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search of "integral parts" of the automobile justified a fortiori a
search of containers within the vehicle.175
D. The Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, filed a vigorous
dissent in Ross.176 The dissenters favored granting to "any mova-
ble container found within an automobile ... precisely the same
degree of Fourth Amendment warrant protection that it would de-
serve if found at a location outside the automobile.'U7 7 They ar-
gued that the majority had "utterly disregard[ed] the value of a
neutral and detached magistrate."' 78 After listing the virtues of
the warrant requirement,7 9 Justice Marshall complained that the
traditional rationales for the automobile exception-mobility and
lesser expectations of privacy-do not support extending the ex-
ception to searches of containers found inside vehicles. 80 Con-
tainers are easily immobilized and are often imbued with
significant privacy expectations.181 "Ultimately," said Justice Mar-
shall, "the majority, unable to rely on the justifications underlying
the automobile exception, simply creates a new 'probable cause'
exception to the warrant requirement for automobfles."' 82 "The
175. Id. at 2169.
176. Id. at 2173. Justice White also filed a brief dissenting opinion. Id. at 2173.
177. Id. at 2177.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2174-75, 2177. See also notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra.
180. 102 S. Ct. at 2176.
181. Id..
182. Id. Justice Marshall explained:
The majority's sleight-of-hand ignores the obvious differences be-
tween the function served by a magistrate in making a determination
of probable cause and the function of the automobile exception. It is
irrelevant to a magistrate's function whether the items subject to
search are mobile, may be in danger of destruction or are impractical
to store, or whether an immediate search would be less intrusive
than a seizure without a warrant. A magistrate's only concern is
whether there is probable cause to search them. Where suspicion
has focused not on a particular item but only on a vehicle, home, or
office, the magistrate might reasonably authorize a search of closed
containers at the location as well. But an officer on the beat who
searches an automobile without a warrant is not entitled to conduct a
broader search than the exigency obviating the warrant justifies. Af-
ter all, what justifies the warrantless search is not probable cause
alone, but probable cause coupled with the mobility of the automo-
bile. Because the scope of a warrantless search should depend on
the scope of the justification for dispensing with a warrant, the entire
premise of the majority's opinion fails to support its conclusion.
The majority's rule masks the startling assumption that a police-
man's determination of probable cause is the functional equivalent of
the determination of a neutral and detached magistrate. This as-
sumption ignores a major premise of the warrant requirement-the
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only convincing explanation ... for the majority's broad rule is ex-
pediency; it assists police in conducting automobile searches, en-
suring that the private containers into which criminal suspects
often place goods will no longer be a Fourth Amendment
shield."183
IV. ROSS: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
The Ross dissenters described the case as "having profound im-
plications for the privacy of citizens traveling in automobiles."'
184
While this is no doubt true, the impact of Ross may ultimately ex-
tend beyond the automobile into the fourth amendment world in
general. But before exploring these broader ramifications, the is-
sues addressed in Ross will be more closely analyzed and
critiqued.
A. Ross: Persuasiveness of the Rationale
A significant feature of the majority opinion in Ross is its appar-
ent rejection of the exigent circumstance rationale for the automo-
bile exception. While the Court had earlier spoken of "automobile
mobility,"' 85 there is no suggestion in Ross that a showing of actual
exigency is a prerequisite for either the initial stop of an automo-
bile or the subsequent seizure or search of its contents. Had the
Ross Court seen fit, it could have utilized the exigent circumstance
justification at least in support of the initial stop of Ross's car.
Probable cause to search arose while the car was mobile and in
circumstances where, due to the mobility, obtaining a warrant
prior to the initial encounter with the car would have been imprac-
tical. Therefore, as in Carroll and Chambers, but unlike Coolidge,
"backward in time exigency"'186 did exist in Ross. The Court's fail-
ure to note this fact may be indicative of its having now dropped all
pretenses of adherence to an exigent circumstance theory in auto-
mobile cases. If, indeed, Carroll now means that probable cause,
alone, justifies the search of lawfully stopped vehicles and their
importance of having a neutral and detached magistrate determine
whether probable cause exists. The majority's explanation that the
scope of the warrantless automobile search will be "limited" to what
a magistrate could authorize is thus inconsistent with our cases,
which firmly establish that an on-the-spot determination of probable
cause is never the same as a decision by a neutral and detached
magistrate.
Id. at 2177 (citation omitted).
183. Id. at 2181.
184. Id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 35, 43 & 60.
186. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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contents, 8 7 even where the police have had probable cause "for
some time" prior to the seizure of the car as in Coolidge,8 8 the
Ross Court has apparently totally rejected Carroll's dicta that war-
rants must be obtained where "reasonably practicable."18 9 Also
abandoned is Chambers's admonition that warrantless searches
may not be permissible "in every conceivable circumstance...
even with probable cause." 9 0 If so, contrary to the teaching of
Coolidge, the word "automobile" has indeed become a "talisman
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment [warrant requirement]
fades away and disappears."' 9'
This interpretation of Ross is bolstered by the fact that there is
little discussion in the opinion of "lesser privacy expectations" in
automobiles. Instead, the Ross Court appears to read Carroll and
Chambers as simply exempting automobiles as a class from the
rigors of the warrant rule once probable cause to search exists.
While automobile mobility or diminished privacy expectations
might have provided the historical footing for the exemption, 92 the
fact of the exemption itself, whatever its rationale, appears to be
all that now interests the Court.
Ross, as the dissent suggests, appears to have created a new
probable cause exemption to the warrant rule without providing
satisfactory justification for abandoning the preference for war-
rants. To begin with, the Court suggests that warrantless searches
of containers in Ross-type cases are permissible because similar
searches with warrants would be permissible. 93 Surely the Court
begs an important question by such reasoning. It assumes that the
issue of whether or not a magistrate would have in fact issued a
warrant is unimportant. Perhaps the question is less than crucial
in cases like Ross where the police are correct in their assessments
of probable cause.'9 But what of the cases, surely significant in
number, of mistaken police belief of probable cause? In those situ-
ations, appeal to the warrant procedure may be profoundly crucial
as a means of preventing unjustified intrusions into the container.
Similarly unconvincing is the Court's argument that "absurd re-
sults inconsistent with Carroll" would be generated if police were
187. Carroll was so represented in Ross. See supra note 162 and accompanying
text.
188. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying note 40.
190. See supra text accompanying note 48.
191. See supra text accompanying note 61.
192. See supra note 163.
193. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
194. But even in these cases the warrant process serves the symbolic function of
"reassuring the public that the orderly process of law has been respected."
102 S. Ct. at 2175 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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required to obtain warrants prior to searching "burlap sacks and
paper bags" legally seized under the automobile exception.195 In
such circumstances, the warrant requirement would indeed be ab-
surd under Carroll if that decision was premised solely on the
lesser expectation theory of automobile privacy and if "burlap
sacks and paper bags" are imbued with minimal privacy expecta-
tions. To so read Carroll, however, is to strain the obvious thrust
of the opinion.196 Moreover, to justify the conclusion that burlap
sacks and paper bags found in cars lack privacy protection because
"the privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may
be no less than those in a movable container,"197 overlooks the fact
the privacy interests in such movable containers as locked dia-
ries,198 closed purses, and, of course, footlockers, and luggage, are
often as substantial as such interests ever become. Furthermore,
at one time or another, almost everyone carries these highly pri-
vate containers in their automobiles. On the other hand, if Carroll
is based on the exigent circumstance theory, as it in fact appears to
be,199 no obvious absurdity exists in requiring a warrant before
searching the Court's burlap sacks and paper bags which have
been seized by the police, since no exigency exists once the police
immobilize such containers.200 While a warrant requirement for
searches of cars themselves may be unsound, given the practical
problems of securing such large and valuable pieces of property
while warrants are sought,201 the same problems do not appear as
significant when securing burlap sacks and paper bags.202
As for the Court's conclusion that the warrant requirement for
containers would effectively increase the magnitude of privacy in-
vasion since both cars and containers would end up being
seized,203 persons seeking to avoid the major privacy intrusion en-
tailed in seizing the car while a warrant is sought could always
consent to, indeed request, an immediate warrantless search of the
car and its containers.204
195. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
198. A locked diary may be a "container" for a variety of small items: love letters,
tablets of drugs, photographs, marijuana, cigarettes, etc.
199. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
200. These points are made by the Ross dissenters. 102 S. Ct. at 2174, 2179.
201. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
202. There might of course be cases where securing all the containers in a car
would create administrative inconvenience. In such situations the police
could simply seize the entire car. The occupants of the car could avoid the
car's seizure if they so desired by consenting to an immediate warrantless
search of the containers.
203. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
204. 102 S. Ct. at 2179 (dissenting opinion): "IT]he defendant, not the police,
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In general, the Ross opinion is unpersuasive. Without adequate
reasoning, the Court carves out a new doctrine which limits the
previous scope of the warrant rquirement in an area touching im-
portant aspects of American life.
B. Ross: Justified Bright Line or Untenable Departure From
Constitutional Principle?
Whatever the technical deficiencies of the Court's opinion in
Ross, the case is less objectionable if it promotes sound policy.
Therefore, although the dissent's indictment of Ross as a decision
premised entirely on the majority's interest in promoting expedi-
ency in law enforcement appears well placed, the criticism is not
necessarily decisive if law enforcement expediency is a sufficiently
compelling interest. This Article's assessment of the justification
for the Ross rule will be based on the answers to four questions:205
(1) How genuine was the need to include secondary containers
under the automobile exception? (2) Is the Ross rule the bright
line standard it is meant to be? (3) Is the Ross rule subject to ma-
nipulation and abuse? (4) Apart from its articulated virtues, is the
Ross rule likely to promote secondary values?
1. The Necessity for the Ross Rule
Surprisingly, the Ross Court offers little explanation for the
need to abandon the opaque container rule of Robbins in favor of
the Ross doctrine. The Court does allude to the need to achieve
"clarity" in the law20 6 but that interest is hardly compelling since
the opaque container rule was itself relatively clear.20 7 The
Court's concern for clarity was thus more likely a function of the
fact that a majority had not embraced the opaque container rule
rather than a view that the rule itself was unclear. If, however, the
Court felt that the absence of a majority opinion in Robbins ren-
dered the law intolerably unclear, it made little effort to establish
that fact.2
08
should be afforded the choice whether he prefers the immediate opening of
his suitcase or other container to the delay incident to seeking a warrant." It
must be noted, however, that the "choice" may not occur to the defendant nor
be suggested by the police. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 162 (Supp. 1982).
205. Professor LaFave employed a similar set of questions in his recent critique of
Belton. See 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 134 (Supp. 1982).
206. 102 S. Ct. at 2161.
207. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
208. The Court did trace the checkered history of the Ross case in the lower courts
prior to its arrival at the Supreme Court. Originally, a three-judge panel of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had, under footnote 13 in Sanders,
upheld the search of the paper bag, but not that of the pouch. United States
v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 9-18 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980). The entire District
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Another possible explanation for the necessity of the Ross rule
can be extrapolated from the Court's citation to the fact that auto-
mobile searches are common occurrences.
[Countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public streets every
day and our cases demonstrate that it is not uncommon for police officers
to have probable cause to believe that contraband may be found in a
stopped vehicle. In every such case a conflict is presented between the
individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and the public
interest in effective law enforcement. 2
09
The high incidence of police contact with automobiles creates a
special administrative problem: If warrants are required before
any secondary container, e.g., dixie cup, cigarette pack, etc., is
searched, will not the warrant process be trivialized by its
overuse? Professor LaFave states the problem this way:
Given the empirical evidence that the judiciary "does not always take seri-
ously its commitment to make a 'neutral and detached' decision as to
whether there exist grounds for a search," this later principle [that the
warrant process can best serve as a meaningful device for the protection
of Fourth Amendment rights if used selectively to prevent those police
practices which would be most destructive of Fourth Amendment values]
would appear to have some substance to it. The underlying hypothesis [in
the automobile search cases] is that if warrants are required for all
searches and seizures but those occurring under truly exigent circum-
stances, then the warrant process becomes a mechanical routine with rel-
atively little magisterial scrutiny, but that if on the other hand warrants
are required for a comparatively small group of police activities which are
highly intrusive in nature, then the tendency will be to give these warrant
requests close examination.
2 10
LaFave's points are well taken. But whether they justify Ross's
total abandonment of the warrant requirement is not clear. Before
resorting to such a drastic move, perhaps some thought should
have been directed toward ways of improving the warrant
process. 211
of Columbia Circuit voted to reconsider the case en banc. This time the
court, with four judges dissenting, adopted a rule tantamount to the opaque
container doctrine of Robbins in invalidating the search of the paper bag as
well as that of the pouch. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (1981).
With the opaque container rule receiving the approval of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, it is not unlikely that other courts, federal and state, would
have followed in adopting the Robbins doctrine. If so, it is unclear why the
Supreme Court felt such an immediate need in Ross to clarify the law.
209. 102 S. Ct. at 2161-62.
210. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 518.
211. Professor Yackle makes the following points:
I frankly doubt that the Court has given judicial supervision a fair
chance before finding fault and shelving the idea. I am persuaded
that if the Court were to become serious about the warrant require-
ment and were to insist that the police and judges turn square cor-
ners in the warrant process, judicial supervision might yet become
effective despite the shortcomings of the past. To date, however, the
Court has not so much as demanded that issuing officers be demon-
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2. Ross as a Bright Line
Ross establishes that warrantless searches of cars and contain-
ers within are permissible if police have probable cause to believe
that contraband or other evidence is being carried somewhere
within the vehicle. By distinguishing Chadwick and Sanders,212
however, the Ross Court implies that warrants are still required in
cases where police have probable cause to believe that the evi-
dence they seek is enclosed within a specifically identified
container.
A variety of unanswered questions remain. First, what if, as in
Coolidge, the police have had probable cause to search a vehicle
for a significant period of time, perhaps thirty days, prior to their
first encounter with the car parked in a suspect's driveway? The
Ross Court nowhere refers to Coolidge so assessments of the con-
tinued vitality of Coolidge are speculative. On the one hand, as
discussed above, Ross may spell the demise of Coolidge.213 On the
other hand, the facts of Ross do not require the rejection of Coo-
lidge because "backward exigency" did exist in Ross.214 A totally
bright line rule in Ross might have supplied dictum clarifying the
present status of Coolidge.215
The Ross rule also creates uncertainty in light of Chadwick and
Sanders. The Ross dicta implies that warrants must be obtained
in Chadwick and Sanders situations where police have probable
cause to search specific containers before they are ever placed in a
car.216 But what of cases where police obtain probable cause to
search specifically identified containers after they are already in a
car? Thus, assume that the informant in Ross had told the police
that "Bandit" was selling drugs contained in a closed brown paper
bag in the trunk of his car? Could the police open the bag without
a warrant? Ross is ambivalent.
If, on the one hand, the Ross Court requires warrants in Chad-
wick and Sanders situations as a means of preventing the police
strably qualified for their extraordinarily difficult and important
work, and in fact has asked for no more than financial independence.
Yackle, supra note 18, at 415.
212. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 184-87.
215. Clarification of the status of Coolidge in Ross would have been dicta since the
Ross Court did not face the issue of whether warrantless searches of
automobiles were permissible where no "backward exigency" exists.
216. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text. Although the Ross Court does
not make specific mention of the fact, probable cause to search the containers
in both Chadwick and Sanders existed prior to the time the container came
into contact with an automobile. See supra notes 75-76 and 92-94 and accom-
panying text.
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from escaping the warrant rule, by waiting to search containers un-
til they are placed in cars, under the pretext of the automobile ex-
ception,217 then there is no reason to require warrants where
containers are already in automobiles at the time probable cause
to search arises. From this reading of Chadwick and Sanders, the
warrant requirement would hinge on the state of mind of the
searching officer-warrants are necessary if the officer intends to
avoid the warrant requirement. Far from introducing clarity, such
emphasis on police intent creates new uncertainty. Must actual
subjective intent to engage in a "pretext" search be shown before
warrants are required, or would an objective measure of intent-
what a reasonable officer under the circumstances would intend-
be sufficient? If the latter, how will officers in the field ever be cer-
tain as to whether or not courts will later view their actions as pre-
text searches?
If, on the other hand, the reason for requiring warrants in Chad-
wick/Sanders situations is based not on an interest in preventing
pretext searches, but rather in protecting the privacy interests in-
herent in containers such as footlockers and luggage, the police
would seemingly be required to obtain warrants before searching
such containers in cases where probable cause to search specific
containers arises after the container has been placed in an auto-
mobile. The administrative inconvenience interest used to justify
Ross appears less apposite where police know in advance of their
search which containers likely house the sought after evidence.
Although in cases like Ross it might indeed be inconvenient to se-
cure every secondary container while search warrants are sought,
especially where the containers are numerous and heavy in
weight,218 in general, little inconvenience would be encountered in
securing only those containers the police have probable cause to
believe contain evidence.2 19 Thus, the Ross Court might have
reached a different result had the informant told the police that the
drugs were in a paper bag in the trunk of "Bandit's" car. If so, the
Ross Court's talk of the equivalence of the privacy interest in sec-
ondary containers and integral parts of automobiles 220 would,
inexplicably, be limited to cases, like Ross, where police have no
217. The Ross dissenters suggest that the majority may be giving this interpreta-
tion to Chadwick and Sanders. 102 S. Ct. at 2180.
218. Consider, for example, the problems created for a single police officer in se-
curing a two hundred-pound footlocker being carried in an automobile.
219. If, however, a single police officer is required to secure a heavyweight
container, see, e.g., supra note 218, administrative inconvenience is a prob-
lem, even if the officer knows in advance that the particular container houses
the evidence.
220. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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reason in advance of their search to suspect any particular secon-
dary container.
In comparison, Ross appears to provide fewer bright lines than
did Robbins. Because Robbins was conceptualized as a container
case and not as an automobile exception case,221 the Carroll,
Chambers, and Coolidge line of cases was unaffected by the
opaque container rule of Robbins. Thus, unlike Ross, Robbins ob-
viously left Coolidge untouched. Moreover, Robbins encountered
none of Ross's difficulties in relation to Chadwick and Sanders.
Robbins merely clarified the meaning of Sanders's footnote
thirteen.22
2
Under Robbins, warrants were required to search all opaque
containers whose contents were not in plain view,223 regardless of
whether or when such containers were placed in automobiles. The
only genuine lack of certainty surrounding Robbins stemmed from
the fact that a majority of the Court did not embrace the opaque
container doctrine.
3. Ross as Subject to Manipulation and Abuse
In addition to its failure to establish a bright line, the Ross doc-
trine may also be a source of manipulation and abuse by the po-
lice. If the obligation to obtain a warrant in secondary container
cases now hinges on whether or not the police have probable cause
to search the container itself, as opposed to the car in general,
224
police officers now have an incentive to avoid discovering informa-
tion regarding the exact container housing evidence within a car so
long as they have probable cause to search the car itself. From the
standpoint of the police officer who is not particularly enamored
with the boring routine of traipsing downtown to obtain search
warrants, the less she/he knows the better, since knowledge of the
particular location of the evidence within the automobile may trig-
ger the warrant requirement. Suppose that the Ross facts arise
again but this time the informant knows not only that drugs are
being dealt from the trunk of a car, but also that they are enclosed
by a brown paper bag. When the informant begins to relate this
information to the police, the informant may discover that the of-
ficer is not interested in hearing about brown paper bags, or of
trunks, once the officer has obtained probable cause to believe that
drugs are carried somewhere in a car. Armed with this informa-
tion, the officer can conduct a warrantless search of the entire car
and all its containers in hopes of finding not just the drugs de-
221. See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text.
223. Id.
224. See supra notes 216-20 and accompanying text.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
scribed by the informant but other evidence as well. Therefore,
Ross and its dicta might be manipulated to justify broad intrusions
into entire vehicles when only limited invasions would have been
permitted had the searching officer been interested in obtaining
readily available information which would more narrowly focus
the target of the search.
If, however, Ross may discourage discovery of the exact loca-
tion of evidence, the opaque container rule of Robbins would ap-
pear to have the opposite effect. Under Robbins, officers would
know that no closed opaque container could be searched without a
warrant, unless, of course, the search was incident to an arrest.
22 5
Thus, rather than incurring the inconvenience of securing the car
or all the various containers therein while a warrant is sought, po-
lice may well prefer to secure only the container thought to en-
close the evidence. The police would seemingly be interested,
whenever possible, in discovering the exact whereabouts of evi-
dence within automobiles. Therefore, by choosing Ross over Rob-
bins the Court may have opted for more extensive police
intrusions into the confines of automobiles themselves, not to men-
tion the containers within. While some law enforcement benefit
might be gained, considerable protection of privacy would appear
to have been lost.
4. Secondary Values of Ross
The Ross Court articulated three basic values thought to be pro-
moted by its decision: (1) a bright line standard rectifying previ-
ous uncertainty;226 (2) a net decrease in invasions of privacy
because quick warrantless searches of containers would eliminate
the need for the extensive privacy invasions inherent in seizing
cars and containers while warrants were sought;227 and (3) an ac-
commodation to the practicalities of law enforcement.228 As noted
above, it is unlikely that Ross adequately promotes the first
value,229 nor is the Ross doctrine necessary for the effectuation of
the second.230 On the other hand, Ross does appear to be a real
boon to law enforcement officers by increasing their power to con-
duct warrantless searches. If this were the only value promoted by
Ross, the decision would appear to be indefensible, especially in
light of the potential for the rule's manipulation and abuse by the
225. See supra text accompanying notes 124-47.
226. 102 S. Ct. at 2161-62.
227. Id. at 2171 n.28.
228. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 203-04 and accompanying text.
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police.23 1 Promoting effective law enforcement per se is an insuffi-
cient reason for sacrificing constitutionally protected interests.
232
Thus if Ross is to be justified, it must be because the decision pro-
motes important interests in addition to those articulated by the
Court.
One such interest, avoiding the trivialization of the warrant pro-
cess, has already been discussed.23 3 Two other possible secondary
values of Ross require attention here.
First, the Ross rule might have the effect of preventing arrests
which otherwise might have occurred. If, contrary to the teaching
of Ross, police were required to obtain warrants whenever they en-
countered cars transporting containers believed to carry evidence,
two things would likely occur Either the police would quickly ar-
rest the driver and occupants of the car and search all the contain-
ers in the passenger compartment under Belton, or, if an
immediate Belton search was not possible, they would arrest all
the parties and detain them while seeking a warrant. This latter
alternative could result in significant and unjustified invasions of
privacy if no evidence was in fact being carried in the vehicle.
Again, Professor LaFave notes:
Probable cause requires a reasonable probability rather than certainty,
and thus it will sometimes happen that a lawful search will not establish
guilt but instead will exonerate. If the search occurs immediately and on
the scene, this means the driver and occupants of the car will avoid arrest.
But if a container found in a car is a possible location of the contraband
sought and it can only be seized while a warrant is sought, the chances are
that those then associated with the vehicle will also be seized at that time
and will be held in custodyruntil such time as a warrant for the container
is obtained and executed.Z
Avoiding such instances of unjustified arrest by permitting sus-
pects to consent to immediate, on the spot, searches of cars and
containers may not solve the problem since "[it is by no means
clear] that [that] alternative will ordinarily occur to suspects or
will routinely be suggested by police." 235
The other possible secondary value of Ross also relates to ar-
rest: Ross may have the effect of limiting the intrusiveness of Bel-
ton.236 While Ross requires probable cause to search automobiles
and containers therein, Belton permits searches of the passenger
231. See supra text accompanying. note 224.
232. "[Law enforcement] efficiency and promptness can never be substituted for
due process and adherence to the Constitution. Is not a dictatorship the most
'efficient' government?" 102 S. Ct. at 2181 n.13 (dissenting opinion).
233. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
234. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 162 (Supp. 1982).
235. Id.
236. For a discussion of the far-ranging thrust of Belton, see supra notes 136-47
and accompanying text.
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compartment and its containers incident to an automobile occu-
pant's arrest, for whatever offense, even though the presence of a
weapon is highly unlikely and evidence of crime is non-existent.
Belton thus requires far less justification for invasions of automo-
bile privacy than does Ross. If, as some suppose, the Belton doc-
trine resulted because of the Court's failure to reach a consensus
in the companion Robbins case,237 then there is reason to believe
that the Court might reconsider Belton now that a majority has
spoken in Ross. As the author of Ross, Justice Stevens for one
would likely be attracted to abandoning Belton since Ross virtually
restates the conclusions he reached in his Belton concurrence. 238
Perhaps Justice Stevens could now persuade a majority of his col-
leagues that Belton is unnecessary in light of Ross.239
These values notwithstanding, it is clear, given the decision's
defects, that Ross is not one of the Court's finest efforts. Indeed, if
as discussed immediately below, the case now jeopardizes the con-
tinued vitality of the warrant requirement for searches and
seizures of all personal effects outside the home, Ross may well
represent the Court's darkest fourth amendment hour.
V. BEYOND ROSS: THE FUTURE OF THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT IN CONTAINER SEARCHES
Assessments of the future impact of Ross must begin with an
examination of the extent the case departs from prior case law. In
addition to its explicit rejection of Robbins, Ross appears to have
seriously undercut Coolidge, Chadwick, and Sanders. If so, the
fourth amendment warrant requirement may now be non-existent
for personal effects searches and seizures occurring anywhere
outside the home.24
0
A. Ross and Prior Case Law
With its emphasis on "backward exigency" as a necessary con-
dition for permissible warrantless searches and seizures of
automobiles, Coolidge carved out an area, albeit small, of protec-
tion of automobile privacy through the warrant process. Subse-
237. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 140 (Supp. 1982).
238. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
239. Abandoning Belton would not spell the demise of the search incident to ar-
rest exception. Presumably, the doctrine of Chimel v. California would still
govern searches incident to arrest, even those occurring in automobiles. See
supra note 128.
240. The Court has given special blessing to searches and arrests occurring within
the home. See supra note 71. See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981) (search warrant required to enter and search home of A, in which po-
lice believed B, for whom they had an arrest warrant, was a guest).
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quent cases culminating in Ross have seemingly rendered
Coolidge, which was only a plurality opinion, virtually lifeless. 24 1
Probable cause, alone, appears now to be the only standard the
Court requires for permissible searches of automobiles.
As for searches of secondary containers within automobiles, the
situation is more complicated.242 The Ross Court apparently
sought to leave some vitality to the exclusive control rule of Chad-
wick and Sanders.243 The problem is that there appears to be no
principled reason why Chadwick and Sanders should remain good
law after Ross.
Ross clearly establishes that the police may search without
warrants all containers within cars which they have probable
cause to believe carry evidence somewhere within. The Court's
justification for such searches is not based on theories of exigency
created through automobile mobility, or even on the view that sig-
nificant privacy expectations do not attach to automobiles and
their contents. Rather, the Court's rationale centers on the view
that warrantless container searches in Ross situations are permis-
sible because a magistrate could have authorized the searches.244
If, indeed, this is now the Court's view, it would appear that
warrants are also unnecessary in cases where police obtain prob-
able cause to believe that a specific container, already in a car, con-
tains evidence. 245 In such circumstances, a search of the container
would be no more intrusive than that which could be authorized by
a magistrate. This same analysis would seem to permit warrant-
less searches in Chadwick and Sanders situations where police
obtain probable cause to search specific containers prior to their
being placed in automobilies, even though the police have the con-
tainers within their exclusive control at the time of the search.246
After all, a magistrate could and would authorize such searches if
probable cause exists.
Finally, if warrants are no longer required in Chadwick and
Sanders situations, why should they be required for container
searches having nothing whatsoever to do with automobiles? 247 If
a magistrate could authorize the search of a container sitting on a
street corner, why should the police be required to obtain a war-
rant once they have probable cause to believe the container con-
241. See supra notes 65-67, 186-88 & 212-14 and accompanying text.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 215-20.
243. See supra text accompanying note 212. See also supra text accompanying
notes 76-77 & 95-96.
244. See supra text accompanying note 193.
245. Ross does not necessarily permit warrantless searches in the situation de-
scribed in the text. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20.
246. Again, Ross does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. See id.
247. See Katz, supra note 10, at 583.
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ceals evidence? Because the Ross rationale is not tied to the
traditional justifications for the automobile exception-mobility or
lesser expectations of privacy-there appears no reason why the
Ross rationale should not extend to container searches having
nothing whatsoever to do with automobiles.
Ross's bootstrapping of container searches into the automobile
exception may well sound the death knell to the view that warrant-
less searches are per se unreasonable unless falling within care-
fully defined exceptions. 248 If so, the Court will have accepted the
position it supposedly rejected in Chadwick:249 belongings,
whether they are paper bags or photo albums, dixie cups or dia-
ries, are exempt from the warrant requirement once they are re-
moved from the home.25o
B. Recommendations
While the warrant process is far from totally effective,2 51 it
surely provides significant protection against unjustified invasions
of privacy without placing undue costs on law enforcement inter-
ests. Therefore, it is hoped that the Court will rethink its current
position, especially if Ross signals the course outlined immediately
above.
Short of the unlikely possibility of overruling Ross and starting
anew the process of structuring a doctrinally sound automobile ex-
ception,252 the Court should at least limit Ross to its facts. War-
248. See id. at 601.
249. See supra text accompanying note 78.
250. See Grano, supra note 17, at 636.
251. See, e.g., note 18 and text accompanying note 210, supra.
252. Should such a reexamination of the automobile exception occur, the Court
should ground the exception firmly on the exigent circumstances rationale
and reject the fiction that automobiles possess minimal expectations of pri-
vacy. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
The Court must reconsider Chambers and succeeding automobile ex-
ception cases, and abandon unsupported generalities. It should rein-
troduce traditional fourth amendment principles so that the
automobile exception is compatible with established search and
seizure rules, permitting waiver of the warrant requirement only
when exigent circumstances or a genuine claim of impracticality
exists.
Katz, supra note 10, at 572.
[U]nder a true exigent circumstances rationale, no persuasive argu-
ment can be made for the retention of Chambers. By failing to re-
quire "truly" exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search,
the Court in Chambers departed from the only rationale that gives
appropriate respect to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
Moreover, stare decisis should not stand in the way of reconsidering
Chambers, because Chambers is responsible for much of the confu-
sion in present search warrant law. By granting certiorari in Ross to
reconsider Robbins, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that stare
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rants should be required in cases like Coolidge where no
"backward exigency" justifies a warrantless intrusion. As for
searches of secondary containers, warrants should be required
whenever police have knowledge, prior to their actual encounter
with an automobile, that a particular container within the vehicle
likely houses incriminating evidence,253 Warrants should be re-
quired for searches of all containers, not associated in any way
with automobiles, which evidence privacy expectations.2 54
Moreover, the Court should reconsider Belton in light of Ross.
Unless truly justified by exigent circumstances, searches and
seizures of private effects within automobiles should not be per-
mitted without a showing of probable cause.
While many of these recommendations may be inconsistent
with the logic of Ross, that "logic" is itself wanting. Better to be
illogical and maintain some integrity for the warrant process than
to emasculate that process by following the sweeping implications
of a tenuous opinion.
Finally, if the Supreme Court permits Ross to spell the demise
of the warrant requirement for all container searches and seizures
outside the home, state courts should provide increased protection
against such warrantless intrusions under their state constitu-
tions.25 5 If vigorous protection of privacy is not to be forthcoming
from the fourth amendment, similar state provisions must be uti-
lized to guard against unjustified governmental intrusions into the
lives of citizens.
decisis should not prevent a necessary re-examination of the warrant
issue.
Grano, supra note 17, at 645-46.
253. Police would of course be permitted to secure the containers while warrants
are sought. Ordinarily, little time need be spent nor inconvenience incurred
in securing the sought after container(s).
254. Identifying containers evidencing privacy expectations is, of course, some-
times difficult. The Court seemed willing to take on such a task, however, by
its comments expressed in footnote 13 in Sanders. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 103-04. For a view that the "type of container" inquiry is not inor-
dinately difficult, see 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at 153-57 (Supp. 1982).
Moreover, an "opaque container" analogue to Robbins could be utilized to
avoid the necessity of resorting to a "type of container" analysis in container
search situations not explicitly covered by Ross.
255. See Comment, supra note 106, at 316-17. "Te legal revolution which has
brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independ-
ent protective force of state law-for without it, the full realization of our lib-
erties cannot be guaranteed." Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HAxv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
For an example of a state court affording greater constitutional protection
of privacy interests associated with automobiles under state law than the
Supreme Court recognizes under the fourth amendment, compare State v.




United States v. Ross marks a new era of fourth amendment
jurisprudence. Potentially, Ross has totally eliminated the war-
rant requirement for searches and seizures of automobiles and has
severely limited, if not abolished altogether, the situations in
which police must obtain warrants prior to searching containers
associated with automobiles. Furthermore, the sweep of the Ross
opinion may forbode insufficient protection of privacy interests
surrounding any and all containers and effects found outside the
home.
Excessive crime is a constant threat to safety and security in
modem American society. Indeed, the importance of effective law
enforcement cannot be downplayed. Nor should the Supreme
Court fail to take law enforcement considerations into account in
structuring constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court must
also vigilantly champion the cause of constitutionally protected
values, not the least of which is the private enjoyment of one's per-
sonal effects. "Privacy is not a good that we hold at the pleasure of
the government." 25 6 Ross comes dangerously close to suggesting
the contrary.
256. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L REv. 47, 51
(1974).
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